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Knutson  makes  some  agreeable  points:
the  farm  sector  (or  at  least  a  worrisome
part of it) is financially strapped; the stress
will likely continue because supplies seem
to outrun  demand;  farm  policy  needs  to
recognize macro conditions; and sugar, to-
bacco, and dairy  policy are indefensible.
I  disagree,  however,  with  many  of
Knutson's arguments in support of current
commodity programs.  First, Knutson  sug-
gests  ". . . substantial  changes  have  oc-
curred  in program  orientation,"  and that
flexibility  is a highly relevant policy char-
acteristic.  Johnson, Paarlberg, Rasmussen,
Tweeten, and a host of others, read history
differently  and  insist  that  today's  com-
modity  programs  are  largely  unchanged
from  the  original  1930-1950  legislation.
They  claim  current  policy  has  failed  to
meet  changing  market  conditions  and  to
meet policy  goals.  Knutson  offers  as  evi-
dence  of  change  the  Act  of  1973  which
established  target  prices and loan rates  as
dual features of the commodity  program.
Target  prices,  he  believes,  allowed  pro-
ducer returns to be maintained ". ..  at po-
litically acceptable  levels  . . ."  and lower-
ing  loan  rates  "...  has  encouraged
exports." Surely neither contention can be
supported given the experience  of the cur-
rent farm program. Target prices have not
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maintained  the income of many mid-sized
farms  at  sustaining  levels.  But  they  have
added  (often significantly)  to the incomes
of the largest, most  profitable  farms with
net incomes well above those of  most tax-
payers.  These  program  results  are not, to
use  Knutson's  phrase,  "...  at  politically
acceptable  levels."
Loan rates,  on the other hand, have not
been lowered  to encourage trade. Rather,
loan rates have increased relative  to mar-
ket  prices  and  trade  has  been  restricted.
The  data  on  wheat  make  this  clear.  Be-
tween  1981  and  1983,  loan rates climbed
from  88  to  103  percent  of  market prices
and our market share of world wheat trade
dropped from  48  to 38  percent.
Just where Knutson really comes out on
his contention of program flexibility is dif-
ficult to  say. Take  these statements:
"Farm  commodity  policy  has consistently
run into problems when it  failed to recog-
nize changes in markets and adjust to them.
This  does  not  mean  that  commodity  poli-
cies  are outdated;  although  it may suggest
the need to keep fine-tuning the provisions
of  commodity policy-something  that has
been  going on since  the  1930s."
and:
"Initial  U.S.  commodity  programs  main-
tained  price  supports  at  sufficiently  high
levels that commodities generally could not
be exported  without subsidies.  This  condi-
tion  existed  almost  without  precedent
through  the early  1970s."
Second,  Knutson  argues  current  pro-
grams are  still relevant  because  ". . . tar-
get prices  also  provide the opportunity  to
limit  the  magnitude  of  commodity  pro-
gram  benefits  obtained  by  large  scaleWestern Journal of Agricultural  Economics
farmers."  Surely  someone  as  politically
tuned as Knutson  knows the payment lim-
its are,  in case  after case, totally  inopera-
tive.  Even  Knutson  hedges  his  argument
and  states,  "However,  it  remains  unclear
as to exactly how effective these  targeting
actions  have  been"  and  cites  the  1983
study  by  Johnson  and  Short.  It's  worth
noting that Johnson and Short refer to sev-
en other studies all showing that past pro-
gram benefits have favored  large produc-
ers.
Third,  Knutson  believes  current  com-
modity programs,  perhaps "finely tuned,"
will  reduce the  riskiness  of farming,  bol-
ster farm  real estate  prices  and  incomes,
slow  regional  shifts  in  production,  and
prevent  an  undesirable  concentration  of
agricultural  production.  He  offers  no  es-
timate  of  program  costs  to  accomplish
these  goals and  who would  pay, nor  does
he suggest  who would benefit and by how
much.  Perhaps,  given  the  experience  of
current  programs, the  answer  is that tax-
payers would  pay a healthy  bill and  high
income  landowners  receive the benefits.
At  times,  Knutson  seems  to  bless  the
administration's  farm bill proposals-and
who would argue  that those maintain  the
status  quo?  For  example,  Knutson  wants
loan  rates set  at 75-85 percent  of  a  mov-
ing  average  market  price,  as  does  the
administration.  Knutson  wants  target
prices maintained  and set at a percentage
of moving  average  market prices,  as does
the administration.  But,  in contrast to the
administration's  specific  percentages,
Knutson  leaves this up to "political deter-
mination."  (A  notable lesson of recent  his-
tory, and one which former Assistant Sec-
retary  Lesher  underscores,  is that leaving
decisions  of such importance  to  "political
determination"  often results in  costly, un-
dersirable  policy. Special  interest pressure
in  political  determinations  is intense,  and
broader  social  interests  often  suffer.)
Knutson  wants  payment  limits  set below
$50,000,  as  does  the  administration.  But
again,  Knutson  gives no clue  of what the
level  should be, in  contrast to the admin-
istration.  Knutson  wants  a  sodbuster  pro-
vision,  as  does  the  administration.  Knut-
son  recognizes  the  need  for  "... a  large
exodus  of  resources  from  agriculture,"
which  is at  least  implied  in the  adminis-
tration's proposal  and surely  is  not recog-
nized by current  policy.
I conclude  that  Knutson,  in  truth,  be-
lieves  current farm commodity  programs
are outdated.  His key arguments for their
continued  existence-flexibility,  income
and export enhancement,  and targeting of
benefits-are  not  supported  by  recent
program  experience and  Knutson himself
alludes to his own  doubts about the valid-
ity of these  arguments.  He  offers  no  evi-
dence  that  the  benefits  of  continued
current  programs  (or  even  finely  tuned
current  programs)  would  outweigh  the
costs or that the  net benefits  would go  to
whom taxpayers want.  He admits straight
away that sugar,  tobacco,  and dairy  pol-
icy are  indefensible.  He  embraces  many
of the administration's proposals, in form
at least. The administration's proposals are
for a radical change from current policy.
And, Knutson recognizes the need for sig-
nificant decreases  in resources  devoted  to
agriculture and does not suggest how cur-
rent policy  can  facilitate  this transfer.  In
a clever,  backhanded  way, then, Knutson
has made the case that current farm com-
modity  programs  are  indeed  outdated-
and  he's right.
Tweeten's  paper  is  packed  with  infor-
mation  supporting  his  claim  that  current
programs are outdated: programs  have not
changed  much  in  50  years;  agricultural
problems,  however,  are  vastly  different;
income  instability  and  rural  community
dependence  on  a  single  industry  are  not
unique  to agriculture,  and equity  consid-
erations  suggest  that  agriculture  not  be
treated  preferentially;  studies  show  that
current programs have not helped income
instability;  today's  programs  can  tempo-
rarily  help  cash  flow,  but over-time  ben-
efits are  capitalized  into  land  values  and
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are not realized by intended beneficiaries;
in  general,  only mid-sized  farms  have le-
gitimate  low  income  problems,  and  cur-
rent commodity  programs  fail to  aid this
group; most of agriculture does well with-
out commodity programs; and  the net so-
cial benefits of commodity programs have
been  shown  to be  negative.  These  are  a
rather convincing  set of assertions,  which,
in most  cases,  are adequately  document-
ed.
Tweeten's paper does surface  (or resur-
face)  a few  questions.  He  claims  that ex-
port  plus domestic  demand  for our  agri-
cultural produce is elastic in the long-run,
and  therefore  sustained  commodity  pro-
grams  which  restrict  supply  will  lower
long-run  farm  receipts.  The  profession,
however, is still divided on just how elastic
demand  is.  Johnson,  Womack,  and  asso-
ciates  at the Food and Agricultural  Policy
Research  Institute  (FAPRI)  believe  elas-
ticities  are  still inelastic, and use  such as-
sumptions  in  their  current  analysis  of  al-
ternative  farm  bill  proposals.  Their
analysis  has  the  farm  sector  blossoming
under  a  mandatory  supply  control  pro-
gram.  Since  both Tweeten's  and  FAPRI's
expertise  is  being used  to  form the  1985
Farm  Bill,  it  would  be nice  if something
so basic as demand elasticity were known.
Tweeten  calls  for a transition  program
to ease  financial  stress  as  the government
withdraws  from  its traditional  farm poli-
cies.  In  particular,  he  would  provide  $15
billion  per  year  in  direct  payments  to
farmers.  Such subsidies  seem  inconsistent
with his  earlier evidence  that  (1) in gen-
eral  it  is the mid-sized  farms  which  bear
the most financial hardship and (2) "if $15
billion  were  divided  equally  among  the
mid-sized  farms,  payments  would  be
$133,000 per farm."
Both the elasticity  issue and the transi-
tion  subsidy  proposal  are  important  con-
siderations  in  forming  new  policy.  They
in  no  way,  however,  negate  Tweeten's
considerable  evidence  that  current  com-
modity programs should be  abandoned.
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